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Abstract
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian
mechanics and of Everett’s “many-worlds” interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage
of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics.
It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of
standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived
by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a “quantum equilibrium
hypothesis” that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a “branch weight”
that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than
a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations
based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no
“splitting of worlds”, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory
explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the
Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the
apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being
an objectively deterministic theory.
Keywords: Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Bohmian Mechanics, Many-worlds
interpretation, Everett interpretation, Born rule
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1. Introduction
The fundamental entity in quantum mechanics, the one whose dynamics yields incredibly
precise and empirically well-established predictions, is the wavefunction ψ. However, there is
still no clarity about what exactly this function actually describes or represents. In the usual
terminology, the wavefunction describes “the state of the system”, and it is postulated that when ψ
lies at some given time in a particular subspace of the Hilbert space, then this subspace corresponds
to some particular property that the system obtains at that time. Say that there is a property
with the corresponding subspace V ⊂ H. The system is said to have this property if and only
if its state is described by some wavefunction ψ ∈ V . Say there is another property a with the
corresponding subspace Va that is not a subspace of V but which is not orthogonal to V . Then ψ
can be decomposed into a component ψa ∈ Va and another component ψ∼a ∈ V∼a, where V∼a is
the orthogonal complement to V , so that Va ⊕ V∼a = H and
ψ = ψa + ψ∼a. (1)
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1.1. Quantum logic
Given the decomposition (1), what can be said about the system with respect to the property
a? Orthodox quantum mechanics says that the system simply does not have property a. According
to classical logic, then, the system then should be said to have the complementary property ∼a
(not-a), but that would correspond to the subspace V∼a, and the state ψ does not lie in V∼a, so it
cannot be said to have the property ∼a. One way to account for situations like these (which are
totally generic) is to abandon classical logic and assume that statements about quantum systems
follow their own kind of logic; this route is taken by the proponents of quantum logic (Birkhoff
and Neumann, 1936).
1.2. Copenhagen interpretation
Another way to deal with the conundrum is to deny that there is anything to say about the
system having property a or not, as long as there is no measurement of that property. This is
the orthodox route taken by the Copenhagen interpretation. According to this interpretation, a
measurement with respect to the property a leads to a random “collapse of the wavefunction” into
either the state ψa with probability
P (a|ψ) = |ψa|
2
|ψ|2 (2)
or into the state ψ∼a with the complementary probability P (∼a|ψ) = |ψ∼a|2/|ψ|2 = 1 − P (a|ψ).
Put differently, with Πˆa being the projector onto the subspace Va, the component of ψ that lies
in the subspace Va is given by ψa = Πˆaψ, so the result of a measurement with respect to a will
reveal the property a with probability
P (a|ψ) = ‖Πˆaψ‖
2
‖ψ‖2 , (3)
where ‖ψ‖ =
√∫
dq |ψ(q)|2 is the norm on Hilbert space H. The above relation, in this form or
an equivalent one, is also known as the Born rule, after the physicist Max Born who formulated
it first (Born, 1926). Note that in the here chosen presentation a normalization of states is not
required, although it is usually done for the sake of convenience, so that ‖ψ‖ = 1, and so that after
the measurement the resulting collapsed state is again renormalized to unity. This circumstance
can be taken to indicate that the renormalization itself is not a necessary ingredient in the collapse
mechanism (if one is willing to consider it an objective process).
The Copenhagen interpretation corresponds to a rather radical positivist stance. Only if the
property a is actually measured, relation (3) applies, otherwise it is utterly meaningless. Beyond
measurement, there simply is no matter of fact about the system having property a or not, not
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even statistically. Consequently, the probability given by (3) is in the Copenhagen interpretation
not just an epistemic probability, that is, a probability caused by mere ignorance, but rather it
is an ontic probability, that is, a probability caused by actual indeterminacy. Moreover, the act
of measurement is a primitive notion that cannot be analyzed in terms of ordinary interactions
between systems.
1.3. Everettian mechanics
Yet another route is taken by Everettian mechanics (Everett, 1957, 1973), also known as
the Many-Worlds interpretation1. There, the fact of the system having property a or not is
not objectively given, but merely relative to the state of some observer system. The observer
system need not be a human being or any other conscious life form, it may well be an inanimate
apparatus. Consider thus an observed system and an observer system with the Hilbert spaces
HX and HY , respectively, then the Hilbert space of the total system reads H = HX ⊗ HY . An
observer that is able to observe whether property a obtains for the system or not, should at least
have two mutually orthogonal states that are taken to indicate if a obtains or not. These states
are usually called pointer states, because they may be imagined to represent different positions
of a pointer on the display of a macroscopic measurement apparatus. Consequently, the space
HY should be decomposable into two mutually orthogonal subspaces Wa and W∼a, so that if
the pointer state lies in Wa this is taken to indicate that property a obtains for the observed
system, and if the pointer state lies in W∼a this is taken to indicate that the complementary
property ∼a obtains. The measurement must correspond to a specially designed interaction
between observed system and apparatus, so that if the observed system is in a state having
the property a then after the measurement the pointer state should indicate the presence of a,
and similarly for the complementary case. Thus, the measurement interaction is assumed to cause
the following transitions:
ψa ⊗ φ0 → ψa ⊗ φa (4)
ψ∼a ⊗ φ0 → ψ∼a ⊗ φ∼a, (5)
where ψa and ψ∼a are defined as in (1), and where φa lies in the subspace Wa and φ∼a lies in
the subspace W∼a. Notice that since the measurement interaction is, just like any other inter-
action, a linear operation, the above transitions have the same form for arbitrarily normalized
wavefunctions. Before the measurement, the observed system and the observer system should be
1In the following I will not refer to Everett’s theory as the “Many-Worlds interpretation” because the theory
that I put forward is also based on a many-worlds semantics without being reducible to Everett’s theory (see
Discussion).
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uncorrelated, so the pre-measurement state of the total system has the form
Ψ = ψ ⊗ φ0, (6)
where φ0 corresponds to some arbitrary initial pointer state. The pre-measurement state is a
product state, so each subsystem has a state of its own and can be assigned its own properties
given by those subspaces of HX and HY that ψ and φ0 lie in, respectively.
Now what happens if the state of the system before measurement is of the form ψ = ψa+ψ∼a?
Due to the linearity of the measurement interaction, the resulting state of the total system will
not be in product form, but rather will become entangled,
(ψa + ψ∼a)⊗ φ0 → (ψa ⊗ φa) + (ψ∼a ⊗ φ∼a). (7)
Since none of the two subsystems has a state (wavefunction) of its own, none of the subsystems
can be assigned any property at all. Clearly, this is an ontological disaster. Everettian mechanics
resolves the situation by assigning the observed system a state relative to the state of the observer
system. In the above case, the observed system after the measurement would be assigned the
state ψa relative to the observer state φa, and the state ψ∼a relative to the observer state φ∼a:
ψa relative to φa (8)
ψ∼a relative to φ∼a. (9)
The ontological disaster seems to be avoided. However, there are several problematic aspects that
stand in the way of a general acceptance of Everettian mechanics (see Kent, 1990, for a profound
critique of this interpretation).
Pointer basis problem. What does the relativity of states actually mean? According to the follow-
ers of Everett, notably Bryce de Witt (DeWitt, 1970), each of the additive terms in the decom-
position of the post-measurement state
Ψ′ = (ψa ⊗ φa) + (ψ∼a ⊗ φ∼a) (10)
corresponds to a dedicated world where the measurement yields a unique outcome. This sounds
like an objective interpretation. However, it is clear from the construction that the decomposi-
tion (10) crucially depends on the choice of the observer system and its pointer states. Hence, the
theory is not only explicitely observer-dependent, but even worse there is an element of arbitrari-
ness concerning the choice of basis that is used for the decomposition of the universal state vector
into worlds. This basis is also referred to as the pointer basis, and the lack of its clear definition
as the pointer basis problem.
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Ontological extravagance. The Everett interpretation implies a multiplicity of worlds (or branches,
or relative states) that exponentially increases by every measurement-like interaction. Every pho-
ton that hits the retina of an animate observer or that impinges on the surface of an inanimate
system, would cause a splitting of worlds into numerous sub-branches, and each subsequent inter-
action would split them into further sub-branches, and so on. The multiplicity and exponential
inflation of worlds seems to violate the principle of Ockham’s razor in a maximal manner. One
may argue that this violation is only apparent, for the number of postulates needed for the for-
mulation of Everettian mechanics is actually smaller than in the orthodox theory, as there is no
measurement postulate any more; so conceptual parsimony may come at the price of ontologi-
cal excess. Still, an exponential inflation of worlds remains to most people a highly implausible
scenario.
Origin of probability. Although Everett’s theory is fully deterministic, measurement outcomes are,
as a matter of empirical fact, unpredictable and occur only with certain probabilities. What is
the nature of these probabilities and where do they come from? Everett explains the probabilities
as merely apparent to the observer, because the observer state splits into a number of different
branches. This explanation has been considerably refined by Saunders and Wallace (2008) to
the extent that the probabilities are subjective probabilities that the observers attribute to the
measurement outcomes, because together with their world, also their personality splits up, and
they cannot foresee which of these personalities corresponds to their future ego.
Born rule. The Everett interpretation does not seem to yield the quantitative predictions for the
probabilities of individual branches, as given by the Born rule (3). There have been numerous
attempts to derive the Born rule by postulates implicit in, or taken to be at least in support of,
Everett’s theory, but it is still a matter of controversy whether these attempts have succeeded
or not. There are interesting and elucidating attempts by Hartle (1968), Farhi et al. (1989),
and notably by David Deutsch (1999), but all these attempts remain highly controversial (see
Kent, 1990, for a critical discussion on some of these attempts, and see Barnum et al., 2000,
for a negative account on Deutsch’s attempt and Wallace, 2007, for a defense and refinement of
the latter). Everett himself rather vaguely stated that the absolute square of the components
appearing in a given decomposition of the wavefunction represent a natural measure that he puts
into analogy with the phase space measure of classical statistical mechanics. This claim is insofar
problematic as Everett’s measure is basis-dependent and thus cannot be taken to represent an
objectively existing quantity as long as there is no objectively preferred basis given either by
postulate or by deduction from other postulates. Also, while in classical mechanics the phase
space measure is introduced as a probability measure by fiat, Everett and his followers claim that
the probability measure can be deduced from the theory. Of course, one may simply postulate that
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Born’s rule is valid for a fixed pointer basis, but then one would have to accept that Everett’s
theory does not “yield its own interpretation” as is claimed by its proponents.
Despite these (and other) problematic aspects, the Everett interpretation is a scientifically rec-
ognized and intensely discussed interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Vaidman, 2008; Wallace,
2008, for modern accounts on the Everett interpretation).
1.4. Bohmian mechanics
Bohmian mechanics, also known as de Brogli–Bohm mechanics, has been developed 1952 by
David Bohm (1952a,b) and is conceptually close to ideas initially put forward by Louis de Brogli
as early as 1927 (see Deotto and Ghirardi, 1998; Goldstein, 2009, for a modern presentation and
discussion, respectively). The theory has found a brilliant supporter in John Stewart Bell (see
most articles in the paper collection Bell, 2004b). In this theory, the wavefunction is taken to
represent an actually incomplete description of the system. Any system is assumed to consist of
particles being at definite locations, so in addition to the wavefunction these positions must be
specified in order to obtain a complete description. As in Everettian mechanics, a measurement
is considered an ordinary interaction between two systems, one taken as the observed system,
the other one as the measurement apparatus. Let the system consist of N particles, and let
q := (q1, . . . , qN) be the configuration variable of the system, with qk representing the position
variable of the k-th particle. Then Bohmian mechanics postulates that the actual configuration
of the system is given by some definite point q := (q1, . . . , qN) in configuration space Q = R3N .
The complete description of the system is then given by the tupel (Ψ, q) of wavefunction and
configuration. Bohmian mechanics thus takes the wave-particle dualism serious and invokes an
ontological duality. Both the wavefunction and the configuration are taken to describe really
existing entities, differing only by their role. While the actual configuration q is the mathematical
representation of the positions of really existing point-like particles, their time-course is guided
by the wavefunction Ψ, which is a mathematical representation of a really existing field, and it
evolves on its own according to the usual Schrödinger dynamics. The only properties that particles
really possess, are their positions, and functions thereof2. Any other so-called “observable” is only
representing some feature of the wavefunction. This includes notably the spin, which is no longer
considered a property of particles but rather a feature of the wavefunction.
2By taking the time-derivative of a particle’s position, one obtains its velocity, and by multiplying it with the
particle’s mass, its momentum. So, these properties may also be regarded as properties of the particle, although
derived ones. Note, however, that the so-obtained momentum is unrelated to what is measured by the momentum
operator. See the Appendix for a connection between a particle’s momentum and the phase of the wavefunction,
as originally conceptualized by Bohm.
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Similar to Everettian mechanics, the solution to the conundrum about a system with wavefunc-
tion ψ having some feature a or not, involves a process of measurement as an ordinary interaction
between the system and another system that represents the apparatus from where the measure-
ment result may be read off. In Bohmian mechanics, the only property possessed by particles
is their position, so any measurement that aims to measure an “observable”, hence a feature of
the wavefunction, must result in a macroscopic change in the particles’ configuration. We may
here thus adapt the measurement mechanism that we readily described in the context of Everett’s
theory, with the sole but crucial modification that the pointer states have to involve macroscopi-
cally distinguishable particle configurations. This is done by requiring the pointer states to have
non-overlapping support in the configuration space of the measurement device, thus
supp(φa) ∩ supp(φ∼a) = 0. (11)
Hence, the two terms appearing in the post-measurement state (10) cannot have both their support
including the actual configuration q. One of them must be “empty”, that is, exactly one of either
ψa⊗φa or ψ∼a⊗φ∼a has a support that includes q. According to the dynamical laws of Bohmian
mechanics, empty branches have no effect on the particles, so the post-measurement wavefunction
can be reduced to an effective wavefunction that is either ψa ⊗ φa or ψ∼a ⊗ φ∼a. So, just as in
conventional quantum mechanics, there is an effective “collapse of the wavefunction”, however not
as an objective process but rather as a technical trick to reduce the complexity of the calculations.
However, there are two issues with Bohmian mechanics that deserve to be mentioned as the main
obstacles towards a general acceptance.
Quantum equilibrium. One problematic issue is related to the empirically undeniable statistical
character of the measurement results. Just like Everettian mechanics, Bohmian mechanics is a
deterministic theory, and there seems to be prima facie no reason why the particles occupy one
branch of the post-measurement state rather than another, with a probability whose value is
precisely given by Born’s rule (3). The proponents of Bohmian mechanics argue that the prob-
ability that appears in Born’s rule, is just an epistemic probability that is caused by ignorance
concerning the initial particle configuration. In close analogy to classical statistical mechanics,
so their argument, one must introduce a probability density ρ on configuration space that cap-
tures the ignorance about the actual configuration q which is a result of the ignorance about the
initial configuration. The predictions of Bohmian mechanics are indistinguishable from those of
conventional quantum mechanics, exactly if
ρ = |ψ|2 (12)
for some arbitrary “initial” time. The dynamical laws then guarantee that (12) holds for all times.
So, Born’s rule is replaced by relation (12) which, in lack of a derivation, has the status of a hy-
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pothesis, and it is called the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. From there, with the help of the dy-
namical laws, the Born rule can be derived, so it no longer exists as an additional postulate. There
are attempts to derive the quantum equilibrium hypothesis at least in an approximative manner.
Antony Valentini has shown that any arbitrary initial probability density on the configuration
space becomes eventually indistinguishable from |ψ|2 at a coarse-grained scale (Valentini, 1991).
His theorem is partly analogous to Boltzmann’s famous H-theorem, which motivates Valentini to
name his theorem the subquantum H-theorem. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi propose to consider
the quantum equilibrium as a feature of typical initial configurations (Dürr et al., 1992).
Empty branches. The second issue with Bohmian mechanics may at first sight appear rather
harmless, but which on a closer look develops considerable destructive power: the issue of empty
branches. These are the components of the post-measurement state that do not guide any particles
because they do not have the actual configuration q in their support. At first sight, the empty
branches do not appear problematic but on the contrary very helpful as they enable the theory to
explain unique outcomes of measurements. Also, they seem to explain why there is an effective
“collapse of the wavefunction”, as in ordinary quantum mechanics. On a closer view, though,
one must admit that these empty branches do not actually disappear. As the wavefunction is
taken to describe a really existing field, all their branches really exist and will evolve forever by
the Schrödinger dynamics, no matter how many of them will become empty in the course of the
evolution. Every branch of the global wavefunction potentially describes a complete world which is,
according to Bohm’s ontology, only a possible world that would be the actual world if only it were
filled with particles, and which is in every respect identical to a corresponding world in Everett’s
theory. Only one branch at a time is occupied by particles, thereby representing the actual world,
while all other branches, though really existing as part of a really existing wavefunction, are
empty and thus contain some sort of “zombie worlds” with planets, oceans, trees, cities, cars and
people who talk like us and behave like us, but who do not actually exist. Now, if the Everettian
theory may be accused of ontological extravagance, then Bohmian mechanics could be accused of
ontological wastefulness. On top of the ontology of empty branches comes the additional ontology
of particle positions that are, on account of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, forever unknown
to the observer. Yet, the actual configuration is never needed for the calculation of the statistical
predictions in experimental reality, for these can be obtained by mere wavefunction algebra. From
this perspective, Bohmian mechanics may appear as a wasteful and redundant theory. I think
it is considerations like these that are the biggest obstacle in the way of a general acceptance of
Bohmian mechanics.
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2. A Standalone Theory
Let us take a step back to look at the situation. The conceptual problems of Everettian
and Bohmian mechanics somehow seem to be complementary to each other. In Everett’s theory
there is a rather vague, maybe ill-defined ontology, while the ontology of Bohmian mechanics is
crystal clear. Bohm’s theory is burdened with empty branches and principally unknown particle
positions, while there is no such apparent ontological wastefulness and redundancy in Everett’s
theory. Where Everett has a pointer basis problem, Bohm has the position of the particles as a
fundamental variable. While Bohmian mechanics establishes an ontological dualism of particles
and wavefunction, Everett’s theory is monistic. Both theories, however, are confronted with the
challenge of explaining the qualitative and quantitative nature of probabilities that occur during
measurement. So how about combining these two theories? Let us give it a try and see what
happens.
2.1. Ontology
Imagine a universe that consists of finitely many point-like particles in three-dimensional space.
The particles are distributed to form objects like stars, planets, houses, horses, humans, shoes,
and so on. Every distinct configuration of the positions of these particles corresponds to a distinct
world. Some worlds look like yours, some look very different. One of the worlds is yours. But, so
let us assume, all these worlds are superposed to form a unified entity, a metaworld, within which
all these worlds still exist, just like yours. In some worlds, someone like you sits there and reads
this paper. But some atoms are in a different position, the moon has an additional crater, and
the Beatles never split up. Since the position of a point-like particle is a continuous variable, the
variations of the positions of all the particles form a continuum, so there is actually a continuum of
worlds contained in the metaworld. This continuum shall now be described by a time-dependent
universal wavefunction Ψt in such a way that the measure3
µt(Q) =
∫
Q
dq |Ψt(q)|2 (13)
yields the amount or volume of worlds whose configuration is contained within the set Q ∈ Q,
or more shortly, the world volume of Q, at any given time t. Put another way, µt(Q) is taken to
represent amount of world-stuff, or, as the continuum of worlds is mathematically described by the
wavefunction, as the amount of “wavefunction-stuff” distributed over the region Q in configuration
space. But the latter term should not make us forget that it is the metaworld that exists, not the
3The volume element in Q is denoted as dq ≡ d3q1 · · · d3qN here and in the following.
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wavefunction, as the latter is only a mathematical description of the former. Let us conveniently
denote the wavefunction-stuff as metamatter, since it is a stuff that is made of a superposition
of matter (Figure 1). The function defined by (13) mathematically represents a measure on
Metaworld World
(q1, . . . , qN )
q
 
metamatter
matter
Figure 1: Ontology of the proposed theory. The wavefunction Ψ describes a field of metamatter, termed “meta-
world”, which is a continuous superposition of individual worlds consisting of discrete material particles having a
definite position.
configuration space Q, implying a density at the point q in configuration space at time t given by
ρt(q) = |Ψt(q)|2. (14)
So the wavefunction is interpreted as describing a physically existing field, and its absolute square
is taken to represent the density of this field, hence a density of worlds. Because of the Hilbert
space structure (which we accept to be given), the total amount of worlds is at any time t finite,
∀Ψt ∈ H : µt(Q) =
∫
dq |Ψt(q)|2 <∞. (15)
Notice that there are only objective entities introduced so far; all these things are taken to objec-
tively exist, nothing is subjective, indeterminate or vague. In particular, there is no probability.
Now here it comes, and it easily derives from the objective description: The probability that a
randomly chosen world has its configuration contained in a set Q ⊂ Q, is given by the proportion
of the amount of worlds whose configurations are in Q, relative to the amount of all worlds, hence
by the fraction
Pt(Q) =
µt(Q)
µt(Q) =
∫
Q
dq |Ψt(q)|2∫
dq |Ψt(q)|2 . (16)
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This is just the Laplacian rule (Laplace, 1996 [1814], first principle, page 7), straightforwardly
generalized from finite sets to infinite sets. I take the Laplacian rule to be a primitive rule
that cannot be derived from other rules without circularity (see Discussion). The probability
measure (16) implies the existence of a probability density
pt(q) :=
|Ψt(q)|2∫
dq |Ψt(q)|2 , (17)
so that Pt(Q) =
∫
Q
dq pt(q). The probability density (17) is just the “equilibrium distribution” of
Bohmian mechanics. Now what about the “randomly chosen world”? Here is the semantic rule
that gives relation (16) the meaning of a probability in a physically relevant sense: The “randomly
chosen world” referred to in the preamble of equation (16) is someone’s world. It might be a world
where Joe the researcher performs a particular quantum mechanical experiment A, and where Q
corresponds to all configurations that count as “obtaining measurement result a”. After all, it
might be also your world, and Joe tells you the result. Notice, and this is important, that here
we assume that persons do not extend across worlds. You are an inhabitant of exactly one world.
There are countless other worlds where there is someone like you, but it’s not you. It’s just a copy
of you, maybe even a perfect copy. The copy may share all your habits, all your dispositions, your
beliefs, your intentions, yet all your memories. But the copy won’t share your experience. This
conception of persons is crucial to explain why the probability given by (16) plays any role at all
in the empirical reality. It plays a role because objectively, from the perspective of nowhere, there
simply is no matter of fact about what world is actually “yours”. The formula (16) is valid for just
any world. No one can know or predict or even attempt to predict which of the existing worlds is
actually yours, because in the universe described by this theory there is an infinity of worlds that
are all real at the same time. None of the worlds is real a priori while the others being unreal. All
worlds are real a priori, but only one world is real a posteriori, that is, real by experience, to the
one who makes the experience. Let us call such a world that is real by the experience of someone,
a world that is actual to this someone. Probability enters the theory in its concrete application
to an experienced world. The theory cannot foresee which world this is. That is all. The rest is
standard quantum mechanics without measurement postulate.
Since a clean axiomatics is often very helpful in discussing the content and the implications of
a theory, let us provide one.
2.2. Axiomatization
To simplify the treatment and to make the relevant aspects of the proposed theory more
transparent, I shall ignore spin and charge throughout this article. To give the theory a name,
I would suggest “metaworld theory”, since the novel concept of metaworlds introduced below is
12
AB
C
Time
Figure 2: Schematic illustration of the dynamical aspects of the different ontologies of Everettian (A), Bohmian
(B), and the here proposed quantum theory (C). Everettian mechanics describes a universe of constantly branching
worlds that evolve through Hilbert space (A), Bohmian mechanics describes one single world that moves through
configuration space (B), and the here proposed theory describes the flow of a continuum of worlds through config-
uration space, with each world following a Bohmian trajectory (C). Notice that in the proposed theory there is no
branching of worlds as in Everett’s theory.
the essential ingredient that distinguishes the theory from Everett’s “many-worlds” approach, and
also from Bohm’s “pilot wave” theory.
Definition 1 (World) A world is a collection of finitely many particles having a definite mass
and a definite position. It is described by an ordered list m = (m1, . . . ,mN) of masses and an
ordered list q = (q1, . . . , qN) of positions, called the configuration of that world, where N is the
number of particles in that world. The set Q = R3N of all possible configurations is called the
configuration space. The number of particles and their masses constitute the type or kind of the
world. The stuff a world is made of is called matter.
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Definition 2 (Metaworld) A metaworld is a temporally evolving superposition of worlds of
the same kind. This means that there is a time-dependent complex-valued function Ψt over the
configuration space Q, which is an element of the Hilbert space H = L2(Q), and which is referred
to as the wavefunction of the metaworld. The stuff a metaworld is made of is called metamatter.
Postulate 1 (World Volume) Any closed physical system is a metaworld. For a given metaworld
with wavefunction Ψt, for any time t ∈ R and any Lebesgue-measurable set Q ⊂ Q the function
µt(Q) :=
∫
Q
dq |Ψt(q)|2, (18)
is a time-dependent measure on configuration space and represents the amount or volume of worlds
whose configuration is at a given time t contained in Q.
Postulate 2 (Dynamics) The wavefunction Ψt of a given metaworld obeys the Schrödinger
equation
i~
∂Ψt
∂t
= HˆΨt, (19)
where the Hamiltonian Hˆ is a self-adjoint operator on H given by
Hˆ =
N∑
k=1
pˆ2k
2mk
+ V (qˆ), (20)
where mk is the mass of the k-th particle, and where
pˆ :=
 pˆ1...
pˆN
 , pˆk := ~i∇k, (21)
is the momentum operator involving the partial derivatives ∇k := ∂∂xk acting on the position
variable of the k-th particle, and where
qˆ :=
 qˆ1...
qˆN
 , qˆkΨ(q) := qkΨ(q), (22)
is the position operator.
So far the axiomatization; let us look for its implications.
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2.3. Trajectories of worlds
The Schrödinger equation implies that the amount of worlds (18) is a conserved quantity. The
conservation is expressed by the continuity equation
∂ρt
∂t
+∇ · jt = 0. (23)
with the density (14),
ρt = |Ψt|2, (24)
and the current
jt =
1
m
Re{Ψ∗t pˆΨt}, (25)
where Re{z} := 1
2
(z + z∗) is the real part of complex numbers z, and where the momentum
operator pˆ is defined by (22). The current jt is a 3N-dimensional vector field on the configuration
space and can be written in the more familiar form
jt =
~
2mi
(Ψ∗t∇Ψt −Ψt∇Ψ∗t ), (26)
with ∇ := (∇1, . . . ,∇N)T . As a consequence of Postulate 1, the function ρt represents the density
of worlds in configuration space at time t, so ρt is an objective measure and not a probability
density. In some regions in configuration space the worlds are more densely packed than in other
regions, and the continuity equation (23) implies that no worlds are created or destroyed during
the evolution. Because all of the individual configurations q correspond to physically existing
things, termed worlds, there can be assigned a velocity to each of them, and these velocities form
a velocity field q˙t = vt(q). Hence we are justified to write the conserved flow as
jt = ρtq˙t. (27)
Consequently, the configuration of each world is a dynamical variable that evolves according to
the first-order velocity equation
q˙t =
jt
ρt
, (28)
so it implicitly depends on the wavefunction Ψt through jt and ρt. Note that equations (27)
and (28) only make sense for those configurations where Ψt 6= 0. Outside this domain, both the
density and the current vanish, hence there is no well-defined velocity. The velocity equation is
formally identical with the guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics. However, the term “guiding
equation” would be a misnomer in the here proposed theory, as the particles are actually not
guided by the wavefunction but rather are part of the wavefunction, or more precisely: The particle
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configurations correspond to individual worlds which constitute the metaworld that is described
by the wavefunction. So, the dynamics of the wavefunction entails the dynamics of the particles.
To say that the particles were “guided” by the wavefunction would be as inadequate as saying
that the air is “guided” by the wind. Technically, the field that is described by the wavefunction
behaves like a nonclassical compressible fluid that flows through configuration space. The fluid
metaphor helps to visualize the difference between the proposed theory and Bohmian mechanics.
In the latter theory, the particles are ontologically distinct from the wavefunction, they are only
guided by it. In the new theory, the particles are part of the wavefunction (that is to say, of the
metaworld that is described by the wavefunction), and they flow with it. Formally, the velocity
equation is identical to the guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics, but in the new theory this
equation need not be separately postulated but rather, as we have just seen, it can be derived
from the existing postulates. Moreover, since all worlds are taken to really exist, all trajectories
qt that obey the velocity equation, represent really existing histories of individual worlds. These
histories are completely different, ontologically and mathematically, from those in the consistent
histories approach by Griffiths, Omnès, Gell-Mann and Hartle, as in the latter theory the histories
correspond to discrete sequences of projections rather than to continuous trajectories (see Dowker
and Kent, 1996, for an overview on the consistent histories approach), and they are also different
from the “branches” of Everett-type many-world theories, because they form a continuum and they
do not split, so there is a unique past and future for every world. The trajectories are all implicitly
determined by the dynamics of the wavefunction Ψt via the guiding equation which is derived from
both the Schrödinger equation (Postulate 2) and the ontological significance of individual points
in configuration space (Postulate 1), so the wavefunction is all that is needed for the objective
description, it readily describes everything that is objectively real: a wave-like oscillating field of
metamatter that flows through configuration space. Individual particle trajectories and associated
probabilities come into play only when switching to a subjective description. Hence, the mechanics
of the metaworld theory is objectively deterministic and subjectively indeterministic. This way the
conceptual problem of the origin of probabilities can be resolved in a transparent way. It is
a deterministic theory, but only in so far as the objective description is concerned. As soon
as it comes to the subjective description concerning an individual trajectory, probabilities enter
the stage naturally. Notice that also in Everett’s interpretation the probabilities are subjective.
However, there the probabilities are due to the uncertainty to ascribe an individual person a unique
future in a branching universe. Ontologically and conceptually, this is a wholly different story.
Also, Everett’s theory does not provide a unique decomposition of the universal wavefunction, and
even if one could provide it, for example by means of a suitable analysis involving decoherence
effects (see Giulini et al., 1996; Zeh, 1996, for an overview on the decoherence programme), then
the numerical values of the attached subjective probabilities would still remain a controversial issue
(see Discussion). In contrast, the metaworld theory shares with Bohm’s theory the clear ontology
of point-like particles, so position space is the fundamental space for an objective description of
16
reality, and it shares with Everett’s theory the ontology of many worlds. However, while Everett’s
theory contains an at most countable number of worlds, because the Hilbert space is separable
and thus there can be an at most countable number of mutually orthogonal states that evolve
independently from each other, the new theory contains a continuous number of worlds4. This
enables one to define real-valued probabilities directly as fractions of real-valued world volumes, as
is done in (16). There is no need for a limit approximation that may introduce additional issues.
2.4. Measurement
In standard quantum mechanics, “measurement” is a primitive notion that cannot be analyzed
in terms of ordinary interactions between systems. It is introduced there by postulate, so that
any attempt to derive if from deeper concepts becomes impossible. In contrast to that, measure-
ments in both Everett’s and Bohm’s theory are just specially designed but otherwise ordinary
interactions between two systems, where one is considered the observed system and the other the
observer system. A special feature of measurements in Bohmian mechanics is that they must
eventually result in distinct configurations of the observer system that are taken as indicating dis-
tinct measurement results. Since in the metaworld theory, every world is a Bohmian world, and all
these worlds are comprised in an Everettian fashion, we can attack the measurement problem with
the tools of both Bohmian and Everettian mechanics. This will enable us to resolve all relevant
aspects of (ideal) measurements, including a transparent and simple derivation of the Born rule,
which has been so notoriously resistant to derivation in any theory so far.
Consider a factorization of the universe into an observed system and an observer system with
Hilbert spaces HX and HY and configuration spaces X and Y , respectively, so that H = HX⊗HY
and Q = X × Y . Next, consider an orthonormal basis Bi = {χi | i ∈ N} for the Hilbert space HX
of the observed system. Let us say we want to find out whether the observed system is in one of
the states in Bi. Then for each i, a “measurement of χi” would be a process where the presence
of the eigenstate χi of the observed system causes the observer system to evolve from its initial
4There is a transcription of a discussion between Everett and other renowned physicists like Dirac, Furry,
Podolsky, Rosen, Wigner, and Shimony during a conference held in 1962 (Werner, 1962). At some point in the
discussion, Podolsky says, “It looks like we would have a non-denumerable infinity of worlds”, and Everett responds
“Yes” (ibid, page 95). In view of the already mentioned separability of Hilbert space and of the circumstance
that the worlds in Everett’s theory allegedly correspond to components of the wavefunction with respect to some
particular basis, I cannot really make sense of Everett’s answer. (Also the context of the cited utterances does not
make his answer any more conclusive to me.) His statement appears to me as another instance of the unfortunate
vagueness of the concept of “worlds” in Everett’s theory and of the confusion caused by it. One may also take it
more positively and assume that the metaworld theory captures some of the essence of the theory that Everett
originally had in mind.
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state φ0 into a “pointer state” φi, hence it causes the transition
χi ⊗ φ0 → χi ⊗ φi. (29)
As the transition must be unitary, we have ‖φi‖2 = ‖φ0‖2 for all i. For convenience, we suppress
the time variable, since the only thing that matters here is the situation right before and right
after the measurement. In order for the pointer states φi to describe distinct configurations,
they must have non-overlapping support in the configuration space, thus consider a set of non-
overlapping subsets Yi ⊂ Y , so that suppφi = Yi. Let the observed system initially be in an
arbitrary superposition ψ =
∑
i αiχi of basis states from BA, so the pre-measurement state reads
Ψ =
∑
i
αiχi ⊗ φ0. (30)
According to (29), this state transforms into the post-measurement state
Ψ′ =
∑
i
αiχi ⊗ φi. (31)
Finally, let the pointer configurations in each Yi correspond to a unique read-off value ai ∈ R. So
far the objective description. In order to see what happens in a particular world, we have to go
to the subjective description. Let q denote the configuration of a world that is actual for some
particular observer, let us denote him as Joe, right after the measurement. There are uncountably
many other worlds containing an observer that physically resembles Joe, and who may also carry
the name “Joe”, but metaphysically there is only one Joe. By construction, Joe will read off the
measurement result ai if and only if he finds the pointer in one of the configurations contained in
Yi, which means for the total system that the configuration q of Joe’s world must be contained in
the set Qi := X × Yi. The probability for this to happen reads according to (16)
P (Qi) =
µ(Qi)
µ(Q) =
∫
Qi
dq |Ψ′(q)|2∫
dq |Ψ′(q)|2 (32)
=
∫
X
dx
∫
Yi
dy |∑j αjχj(x)⊗ φj(y)|2∫
X
dx
∫
Y
dy |∑j αjχj(x)⊗ φj(y)|2 (33)
=
∫
X
dx
∫
Y
dy |αiχi(x)⊗ φi(y)|2∫
X
dx
∫
Y
dy
∑
j |αjχj(x)⊗ φj(y)|2
(34)
=
|αi|2‖χi‖2‖φi‖2∑
j |αj|2‖χj‖2‖φj‖2
=
|αi|2∑
j |αj|2
(35)
=
‖Πˆiψ‖2
‖ψ‖2 , (36)
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where Πˆi is the projector onto the subspace of HX spanned by the basis vector χi, and where we
have used that φj(y) = 0 for y /∈ Yj, and Yi ∩ Yj = ∅ for i 6= j. So we have derived that the
probability pi = P (Qi) that Joe will read off the measurement result ai equals the probability
given by the Born rule (3). The possible outcomes ai together with the probabilities pi define a
random variable A whose expectation value reads
〈A〉 =
∑
i
pi ai =
∑
i
‖Πˆiψ‖2
‖ψ‖2 ai (37)
=
∑
i
∫
X
dxψ∗(x)(aiΠˆiψ)(x)∫
X
dx |ψ(x)|2 (38)
=
∫
X
dxψ∗(x)(Aˆψ)(x)∫
X
dx |ψ(x)|2 (39)
=
〈ψ|Aˆ|ψ〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 , (40)
where we have used the familiar Dirac notation
〈ψ|φ〉 :=
∫
X
dxψ∗(x)φ(x), (41)
and where we have defined the operator
Aˆ :=
∑
i
aiΠˆi, (42)
which is a discrete, self-adjoint operator on HX with the spectrum {ai}. Thus, it is reasonable to
identify the whole measurement process as the process of measuring the “observable” Aˆ, where Aˆ
is a self-adjoint operator whose eigenvalues correspond to the measurement outcomes, and where
the expectation value of Aˆ is given by the familiar expression (40).
Let us go even further and derive the “collapse of the wavefunction”, which here becomes an
effective collapse in the world of a specific observer. From the moment right after the measurement,
the trajectory of Joe’s world will evolve according to the velocity equation (28), with the point
q ∈ Qi fixing which trajectory is his one. Let t = t0 be the time right after the measurement, then
the velocity of Joe’s world is given by the velocity field q˙t0(q) evaluated at q = q,
q˙t0(q) =
jt0(q)
ρt0(q)
. (43)
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The above expression implicitly depends on the wavefunction Ψ′ evaluated at q. By construction,
q is somewhere in Qi at time t0, and for any q ≡ (x, y) in Qi, we have x ∈ X and y ∈ Yi, and so
the wavefunction of Ψ′ evaluated at q reads
Ψ′t0(q) =
∑
j
αjχj,t0(x)⊗ φj,t0(y) (44)
= αiχi,t0(x)⊗ φi,t0(y) (45)
= ΠˆiΨt0(q) (46)
where we have used that φj(y) = 0 for j 6= i. Thus, from the moment right after the measurement,
the wavefunction that governs the future fate of Joe’s world becomes effectively equal to the
collapsed wavefunction Ψit0 := ΠˆiΨt0 , although the wavefunction is objectively uncollapsed. From
now on, since the Schrödinger equation is linear, the future fate of Joe’s world is effectively
governed by the time-evolved collapsed wavefunction
Ψ
i
t = Uˆ(t− t0)Ψit0 , (47)
where t ≥ t0, and where Uˆ(t) is the unitary time evolution operator obeying the Schrödinger
equation
i~
∂Uˆ(t)
∂t
= HˆUˆ(t), (48)
with Uˆ(0) = 1 and Uˆ−1(t) = Uˆ †(t) = Uˆ(−t). Notice that we do not need any renormalization,
since the probability rule (16) is valid also for non-normalized wavefunctions. Notice finally that
there is no splitting of worlds. Before and after the measurement the total number of worlds is the
same: infinity. Even so, the measurement does not increase this infinity in any way, for the total
“number” of worlds, measured by the world volume (13), does not increase (or decrease) because
the wavefunction obeys a continuity relation, so no worlds are being created (or destroyed). What
happens is that due to the measurement process, the continuous field of worlds can be imagined as
being partitioned into a larger number of smaller volumes of worlds that correspond to the worlds
where the individual measurement outcomes occur. As the theory is deterministic also at the level
of individual worlds, which follows from the unique solvability of the velocity equation (28), the
measurement result obtained in each individual world is determined from the very beginning. It
only appears to be random to the individual observer who spends their lifetime in a particular
trajectory without knowing which one. The conundrum of the splitting of persons that occurs
in Everett’s theory, and that is discussed (and claimed to be resolved) in Saunders and Wallace
(2008), does not show up.
Altogether, the theory not only models but explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabil-
ities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as
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self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunc-
tion” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory. As the
theory justifies the usage of all these familiar elements of standard quantum mechanics, they can
directly be used without worrying about the complicated details of the underlying process.
3. Discussion
This is all nothing new. The relation between Everett’s and Bohm’s theory is extensively discussed
already in the literature. There is indeed a considerable amount of discussion about the relation
between these two theories. Most of this discussion, however, amounts to a more or less elaborate
justification of either one theory being right and the other one wrong, or of one theory being re-
ducible to the other. See, for example, the lucid statements by John Bell (2004a), see an opposed
statement by David Deutsch (1996) including the famous phrase that “pilot-wave theories are
parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial”, see the elaborate reply to Deutsch’s state-
ment by Valentini (2008), and then see the reply to the reply by Brown (2009), and it might well go
on like this forever. However, it seems that no-one has so far made the attempt to systematically
combine these theories on taking their respective ontologies both serious5. The Everettians tend to
think that the Bohmian trajectories are somewhat identical to, or corresponding to, the branches
5On finishing the manuscript, I noticed a very interesting work by Tipler (2006) which seems to be similar in
spirit to the ideas proposed here. The author explicitely writes: “The key idea of this paper is that the square
of the wave function measures, not a probability density, but a density of universes in the multiverse” (ibid, page
1). Unfortunately, though, Tipler does not provide a clear axiomatics, and also he deviates from the concepts here
proposed when, for example, he writes: “In the case of spin up and spin down, there are only two possible universes,
and so the general rule for densities requires us to have the squares of the coefficients of the two spin states be the
total number of effectively distinguishable – in this case obviously distinguishable — states” (ibid, page 4). Such
statement is hard to understand, ontologically. If the number of universes (or “worlds”, as the author also calls
them elsewhere in the paper) is two, then what does it mean to “have the squares of the coefficients of the two spin
states be the total number of effectively distinguishable [. . . ] states”? The word “state” seems to refer to a universe,
or world, and within the same sentence also to something else. How many “states” or “universes” are there, in
that situation, two or infinitely many? Such ambiguity and vagueness about the ontological meaning of the terms
“states”, “branches”, “worlds”, “universes”, is idiosyncratic for Everett-type theories. In the theory proposed here, in
contrast, the worlds correspond to particle configurations, hence their total number is always uncountably infinite,
and spin states are just components of the wavefunction and not labels for, or representatives of, worlds. It seems
that after all Tipler sticks to the Everettian ontology of branches rather than to a continuous multiplicity of worlds,
in contrast to what the author’s initial idea seems to suggest. Other strong indicators for this conclusion are that
in Tipler’s analysis the universes still split, or “differentiate”, as the author also calls it, and that he explicitly writes
“the sums in (15) [. . . ] are in 1 to 1 correspondence with real universes”, where the referenced formula involves
a decomposition of the wavefunction into spin states. Another fundamental difference to the metaworld theory
concerns the justification of probabilities. Tipler writes: “The probabilities arise because of the existence of the
analogues of the experimenters in the multiverse, or more precisely, because before the measurements are carried
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of Everett’s theory, with the “actual configuration” of Bohm’s theory being a sort of “label” that
singles out one of these branches without bearing any ontological signifiance. The Bohmians, on
the other hand, consider the many-worlds ontology as utterly superfluent and extravagant. It is
one of the main results of the present paper that these pictures are both inadequate. If one takes
the ontologies of Bohmian trajectories and of many worlds equally serious, then one arrives at a
standalone theory that is consistent in itself while not being reducible to neither Bohmian nor
Everettian mechanics. Interestingly, such theory resolves the known conceptual issues of both
theories, and also those of conventional quantum mechanics.
The theory is actually just Bohmian mechanics with an additional extravagant ontology of (con-
tinuously) many worlds and with “the actual world” being replaced by “the world that is actual to
someone”. The objective description of the universe in Bohmian mechanics involves two things,
the wavefunction and the actual configuration, thus the tupel (Ψt, qt), while in the metaworld
theory there is only the wavefunction Ψt as an objective description. Nonetheless, the Bohmian
trajectories are also considered as objectively real, only it’s all of them and not only one of them,
and they are just described by the wavefunction Ψt, since the velocity equation (28) emerges from
the Schrödinger dynamics of the wavefunction, which is only possible if one accepts the ontolog-
ical status of single points in configuration space as representing something real. (Otherwise the
crucial relation jt = |Ψt|2q˙t would be devoid of physical content.) Now, just and only when it
comes to a subjective description relative to a particular observer who experiences the universe,
the configuration that is “actual to the observer” comes into play and the trajectories gain their
significance in accounting for the qualitative and quantitative character of probabilities. Thus,
the metaworld theory gains back the elegance of standard quantum mechanics without being af-
flicted by their conceptual and interpretational difficulties. Also, the velocity equation, which in
Bohmian mechanics must be postulated (and is there termed the “guiding equation”), can now
be derived from the postulates. Next, it is possible to rigorously (and not only approximately or
effectively) derive the “equilibrium distribution” as a probabilistic measure to obtain the empiri-
cally correct probabilities for the measurement outcomes. Lastly, the theory clarifies the relation
between objective and subjective description of one and the same reality in a transparent manner.
out, the analogues are ‘indistinguishable’ in the quantum mechanical sense. Indistinguishability of the analogues of
a single human observer means that the standard group transformation argument used in Bayesian theory to assign
probabilities can be applied. I show that the group transformation argument yields probabilities in the Bayesian
sense, and that in the limit of an infinite number of measurements, the relative frequencies must approach these
probabilities” (ibid, page 1–2). Different from this rather sophisticated justification, the probabilities in the theory
proposed here derive from a simple application of the Laplacian rule to a continuum of worlds, together with the
assumptions that 1) the universe is experienced by a person, and that 2) a person exists in exactly one world.
Altogether, I conclude that Tipler’s approach is conceptually different from the theory proposed here.
22
The theory is actually just Everettian mechanics with an additional superfluous ontology of trajec-
tories. The “superfluous” trajectories are precisely what makes the ontology of the theory objective
and well-defined. The ontology of many-worlds as it is conceived in Everett-type theories, involves
the concept of “branches”, which remains a rather vague if not ill-defined concept. Even if one
takes into account a suitable analysis of decoherence effects, the resulting Everett-type theory
(a re-formulation of the consistent-histories approach, also referred to as the decoherent histories
approach, cf. Halliwell, 1995) retains serious conceptual difficulties (see Dowker and Kent, 1996;
Kent and McElwaine, 1997, for a thorough analysis). Most notably, the set of decoherent histo-
ries obtained by the analysis are “incompatible in the sense that pairs of sets generally admit no
physically sensible joint probability distribution whose marginal distributions agree with those on
the individual sets” (ibid, page 1703). This does not happen with the set of Bohmian trajectories.
Since every trajectory is uniquely determined by just one of its points, the probability measure (16)
is already a physically sensible probability measure on the set of Bohmian trajectories, and the
marginal distributions
ρXt (x) :=
∫
Y
dy |Ψt(x, y)|2 (49)
are proper and physically sensible distributions (of worlds and, if normalized, of probability) for
any factorization of the configuration space Q into a pair X × Y . Notice the simplicity of the
obtained σ-algebra of histories: it is given by the family S = {(t, ϕt(Q)) | t ∈ R, Q ∈ Σ(Q)} where
Σ(Q) is the σ-algebra of all measurable subsets of the configuration space Q, and ϕt is the function
that takes each point in configuration space at time t = 0 to its time-evolved counterpart at time
t. Compare this with the considerably more complicated situation in the consistent histories
approach.
How can a continuum of worlds be reasonably considered as real?. People seem to have less prob-
lems in considering a continuous field like the electric field, or even the wavefunction, as real. The
electric field assigns each point in space an electric field strength. If all these field strengths are
taken to physically exist then they represent a continuous infinity of really existing things. Now,
the wavefunction assigns each point in configuration space a complex value, and many people
have no trouble in conceiving all these values as physically existing. No more effort should it take
for these people to consider a continuous field of worlds distributed over configuration space as
real, at least not on grounds of their continuous infinity alone. Maybe the term “world” causes
the resistance. A “world” in the metaworld theory corresponds to a point in configuration space,
in the same way as the state of a classical system corresponds to a point in phase space. The
crucial difference is, of course, that in classical mechanics only one of these points is taken to
physically exist. Now replace “world” by “subjective system state”, which is its exact equivalent
(provided that the observer is part of the system). Then the subjective system state relative to
a given observer (who is experiencing this state) corresponds to a point in configuration space,
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while the objective system state still corresponds to the entire wavefunction. The “system” in the
metaworld theory is conceived of not as a discrete heap of particles but as a continuous field of
worlds, termed a metaworld, that only subjectively appears as a heap of particles to any observer
in any world. This overall conception differs from both Everett’s and Bohm’s theory (and, of
course, from classical mechanics), so the here proposed theory is a theory of its own and not just
a derivate of either of these theories. Let me discuss on a point raised by Valentini (2008) where
he clearly addresses (and rejects) the idea of considering a continuous multiplicity of Bohmian
trajectories as physically real. He writes: “The above ‘de Broglie-Bohm multiverse’ then has the
same kind of ‘trivial’ structure that would be obtained if one reified all the possible trajectories
for a classical test particle in an external field: the parallel worlds evolve independently, side by
side. Given such a theory, on the grounds of Ockham’s razor alone, there would be a conclusive
case for taking only one of the worlds as real” (ibid, page 22). Now, Ockham’s razor commends
us to restrict the explanation of a given phenomenon to involve as few entities as necessary to
still explain the phenomenon. If we deny the physical existence of all trajectories but one, then
we cannot rigorously derive, and hence explain, the Born rule. Instead, we would have to argue
for an “equilibrium distribution” that might effectively or typically reproduce the Born rule, but
the latter then remained a contingent fact and not a necessary fact. Indeed, some proponents of
Bohmian mechanics, including Valentini, assume that there might be yet undiscovered deviations
from the equilibrium distribution and thus there should be measurable violations of Born’s rule
which would, if discovered, certainly strongly speak for the single-trajectory Bohmian theory and
against other theories including the one here proposed. However, there are no such deviations
discovered so far, hence there is no justification from Ockham’s razor to reject a theory that needs
a continuous multiplicity of physically existing worlds to explain the Born rule as a necessary con-
sequence of its postulates. One can go even further. Bohmian mechanics postulates the physical
existence of two entities: the wavefunction and the actual configuration. The theory proposed here
postulates the existence of only one entity: the metaworld that is described by the wavefunction.
This metaworld, according to the theory, consists of worlds (it is a superposition thereof), so the
existence of infinitely many worlds is entailed in the existence of one metaworld. Consequently,
the theory proposed here involves less entities than Bohmian mechanics and should, on account
of Ockham’s razor, be preferred. This conclusion might appear paradoxical; it obeys, however,
the same logic that would enforce us, for example, on accepting the existence of a fluid, to also
accept the existence of all constituents of that fluid.
Only things located in 3-dimensional physical space can be considered as physically real, not things
located in 3N-dimensional configuration space or in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. In classical
mechanics, the state of a system is represented by a point in phase space, which is a space of 6N
dimensions. I consider it implausible to insist that the state of a classical system is not physically
real, just because it is not located in physical space but in phase space. After all, the phase space
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is just a convenient mathematical representation of the positions and momenta of N particles.
Similarly, the configuration space is just a convenient mathematical representation of the positions
of N particles, and the wavefunction is a convenient mathematical representation of the state of
the metaworld. Of course, the particles themselves still “live” in 3-dimensional physical space. For
those who prefer physical space, here is the world density projected to physical space:
ρt(x) :=
∫
dq
N∑
k=1
δ(x− qk)|Ψt(q1, . . . , qN)|2. (50)
When suitably normalized, this expression yields the particle density, so that
〈N〉(X) =
∫
X
d3x ρt(x)∫
dq |Ψt(q)|2 (51)
is the expected number of particles in a region X in physical space. Thus when we look at, say, a
graphical representation of the particle density of an electron, the so-called “electron cloud”, then
we are actually looking at a cloud of worlds projected to physical space, where in each of these
worlds the electron is in a well-defined position, moving around in a nonclassical manner on its
Bohmian trajectory (Figure 3). The appearance of particles as point-like entities at a definite
location in three-dimensional space, results from the subjective experience of the metaworld from
the perspective of a single point, a world, within this metaworld. Consider the appearance of time:
Physically, time is just a continuous parameter in an extra dimension, with none of its constituting
points being preferred, but in our experience time appears as a single point-like temporal entity,
termed “now”, that moves on from past to future. In much the same way, we experience the
wave-like, continuous, high-dimensional metaworld as a set of discrete point-like “particles” that
move through a three-dimensional space.
Isn’t the probability that “my” world is a point in a continuum of worlds exactly equal to zero?.
This question bears on a typical misconception concerning the probability concept in measure
theory. The probability measure of some given set is not “the” probability of this set, but precisely
the probability to randomly pick out an element from this set. In contrast to that, the world that
is actual to a given person, is, well, given and therefore does not have a probability (other than
1) assigned to it. Consider an analogy to classical statistical mechanics: Here, the actual state of
a system always corresponds to a point in phase space, that is, its microstate. Nonetheless, the
system may possess certain macroscopic properties like volume, temperature and pressure. If only
these are given, then this incomplete information is accounted for by describing “the state” of the
system, its macrostate, that is, by a probability density on phase space. Actually, this is a rather
sloppy talk and potentially misleading, for the probability density actually is not “the state” of
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Figure 3: Particle density of the electron in a hydrogen atom in the bound 3d(m = 0) state. In the interpretation
of the proposed theory, this “electron cloud” depicts a cloud of worlds projected to physical space. In each world,
the electron is in a well-defined position, moving around in a nonclassical manner on its Bohmian trajectory.
the system but rather represents a mathematical description of the given information about the
system, whose sole purpose is to obtain the probability to find the true state of the system, its
microstate (which is a point in phase space), within a specified region in phase space.
Why do the worlds in Everett’s theory split, but not in the proposed theory?. Because a world in
Everett’s theory corresponds to a component of the wavefunction, while in the metaworld theory a
world corresponds to a point in configuration space, and as the continuity equation guarantees, no
worlds are created (or destroyed), hence there is no branching of worlds. Notice that “corresponds
to” does not mean “is identical to”. In the here proposed theory, worlds are really existing, and
their configurations are only the mathematical description of these. A particular world in the
here proposed theory is not identical to a particular configuration, but rather the world has a
particular configuration as its property. The relation of a world to a configuration is the same
as the relation of a particle to a position. The particle has a definite position, and in the same
manner a world has a definite configuration.
Why do you take the Laplacian rule as a primitive rule so uncritically?. Consider a cake of volume
W and a piece of this cake of volume V . One will find, without being able to explain why, that
the probability of finding a small marble in this piece of cake, with no other information provided
than that the marble is somewhere in the cake, equals V/W . There is an ongoing discussion
about the actual meaning of the term “probability”, and I do not claim that the metaworld theory
resolves these problems. I only state that, whatever the term “probability” actually means, the
same method to assign a probability to the event of finding a marble in a given piece of a given
cake, provided that the marble is in the cake, also applies to finding a given world in a given
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volume of a given metaworld, provided that the world is contained in this metaworld. The theory
provides a notion of volume, and then the other postulates, together with the Laplacian rule, do
the remaining work. Attacking the here proposed theory on grounds of the conceptual problems
with the notion of probability itself, or on grounds on the applicability of the Laplacian rule, is
somewhat unfair, as these problems exist in any theory dealing with probability. It should be
added that the Laplacian rule plays here the role of a background assumption. Of course, one may
include it as an additional postulate, but that would blur the physical content of the theory. If we
include the Laplacian rule, why should we not also include the Kolmogorov axioms of probability
theory? Or the axioms of measure theory, of set theory, the premises of functional analysis, and
the laws of addition and multiplication? All these mathematical and conceptual structures are
taken as background assumptions, and doing so unveils the idiosyncratic content of a physical
theory.
Can we not apply the Laplacian rule also in Bohmian mechanics and so derive the Born rule?. In
Bohmian mechanics, the wavefunction also describes something real, but this entity is ontologically
distinct from the stuff that forms the “actual world”. The latter is an additional entity that is
described by the “actual configuration”, and that is only guided by the wavefunction; it does
not constitute the wavefunction, as in the theory here proposed. Imagine a classical theory of a
fluid with a speck of dust contained in it, which would be an appropriate metaphor for Bohmian
mechanics in the here relevant sense. The speck of dust would be guided by the movement of the
fluid, but it would be ontologically separate from it. Thus, in this picture, we were not allowed
to derive from the density of the fluid any statement about the probability of finding the speck
of dust within a given volume of fluid. The speck of dust may be located anywhere in the fluid,
disregarding the fluid’s density. This is why we cannot apply the Laplacian rule in Bohmian
mechanics to derive probability statements about finding the “actual configuration” within a given
region of configuration space. The ontology of Bohmian mechanics would not allow this. We would
be reliant on a “quantum equilibrium hypothesis” to justify that the density of the wavefunction
(the fluid) is somehow related to the probability distribution of the configuration of the “actual
world” (the spatial location of the speck of dust).
Your whole “derivation” of the Born rule is based on a measure on configuration space that is
set up so as to eventually yield the correct probabilities. That is arbitrary, if not circular. First
of all, postulates are always arbitrary, right because they are not derived from anything deeper.
Postulates should, however, be plausible enough to be acceptable, and they should not logically
presuppose any statements that one wishes to derive later on. The definition of the measure on
configuration space in Postulate 1 does not logically presuppose the Born rule. Nor does it pre-
suppose a theory of measurement or a concept of probability. The probabilities of measurement
outcomes as given by the Born rule, are only obtained when taking into account all of the postu-
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lates, setting up a theory of measurement that is based on an ordinary interaction between two
systems, applying the Laplacian rule, which is not part of any of the postulates, and assuming
that the universe is experienced from within exactly one world. Notice that none of the entities
introduced in the postulates have anything to do with probability, not even remotely. By Postulate
1, the superposition of worlds is taken to physically exist as a continuum, and its physical exten-
sion, that is, its volume, is given by (18). Now, the actual mathematical structure of this volume
measure is certainly set up with an eye towards its final destination to yield the empirically correct
probability measure. But this “bias” towards a specific structure is as justified or unjustified as
the bias towards, say, postulating the Schrödinger equation, or setting up the Hilbert space as the
space of square-integrable functions on configuration space. One may take the position that the
volume measure is structured just so as to meet the structure of the Hilbert space. If one would
have chosen a different Hilbert space structure, say the space L27(Q), then one would also have
to choose a different volume measure and one would get a theory that may be consistent in itself
but that just does not fit to the empirical reality.
Is the theory Galilei-covariant?. Yes. The two postulated equations (18) (world volume) and (19)
(Schrödinger equation) are both Galilei-covariant. Also the trajectories of individual worlds de-
termined by (28) are Galilei-covariant, as has been shown in the context of Bohmian mechanics
by Deotto and Ghirardi (1998, pp 8-10).
Is the theory Lorentz-covariant?. No. The theory treats time as a separate parameter, hence it
is not Lorentz-covariant. But to present the fundamental concepts and compare the theory with
standard quantum mechanics, and with the theories of Bohm and of Everett, it is good to start
with a nonrelativistic formulation. Clearly, the relativistic generalization of a nonrelativistic theory
is a challenge, and in the case of standard quantum mechanics it leads to quantum field theory,
which is conceptually and mathematically quite a different story. I am, however, optimistic that
a special-relativistic generalization of the proposed theory is possible. Some conceptions might
be taken over from my previous relativistic approach (Boström, 2005), and also the approach
by Nikolić (2005) could be suitable as a conceptual basis for the Bohmian part of the theory.
In the latter, time is treated as a variable on the same footing as position, and the resulting
spacetime variable is then parametrized by an affine parameter, so that Bohmian trajectories
become Bohmian worldlines.
Is the theory non-local?. That depends on the preferred notion of locality. Mathematically, the
velocity equation (28) is a hyperbolic partial first-order differential equation, thus it is local with
respect to its functional domain, which is the configuration space Q. This is because the velocity
field vt(q) = jt(q)/ρt(q) is a function of only the local configuration q, and the initial value problem
is well-defined as long as the initial configuration does not start inside a region of configuration
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space where Ψt = 0, the probability of which is zero anyway, because the world volume vanishes
there. Physically, this means that the dynamics of a given world depends only on the configuration
of that world and on no other configurations of other worlds. Let us denote such notion of locality
with respect to configuration space as metalocality. At the same time, the velocity equation is
nonlocal with respect to three-dimensional physical spaceR3, as the velocity of a particle k at some
location qk in a given world with configuration q = (q1, . . . , qN) and velocity q˙ = v(q1, . . . , qN)
simultaneously depends on the locations of all other particles in that world, regardless of their
distance to the particle k. So, with respect to physical space, the theory is nonlocal. Eventually,
consider a less mathematical and more physical notion of locality, the “principle of local action”
proposed by Einstein (Einstein, 1948, pp 321-322):
Für die relative Unabhängigkeit räumlich distanter Dinge (A und B) ist die Idee char-
acteristisch: äussere Beeinflussung von A hat keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf B.
[translation: The following idea characterises the relative independence of objects far
apart in space (A and B): external influence on A has no direct influence on B.]
This notion of locality may be best understood in terms of signalling : If Alice “influences” her part
of the system, then Bob must not be able to instantaneously detect this influence on his system,
otherwise Alice would be able to instantaneously transmit information to Bob. As is well-known,
the type of correlations, usually called quantum correlations, that are generated by local quantum
operations at remote sites, are not allowing for superluminal communication. Thus from a purely
causal point of view, there is no action at a distance in quantum mechanics, although ontologically
there is one. This “spooky action at a distance”, as Einstein used to call it, or quantum nonlocality,
as it is usually called, is an essential feature of all quantum theories, in whatever disguise it may
come. Consider standard quantum mechanics: If a joined system A⊗B is in an entangled state
|Ψ〉 = |ψA1 〉|φB1 〉+ |ψA2 〉|φB2 〉, (52)
then a local measurement at A instantaneously collapses the total state to a product state, thereby
changing the statistical description of the results of potential future measurements performed at B,
regardless of the distance between A and B. This changes the “dispositional” situation at B, that
is to say, the statistics of the results of potential future measurements performed at B. But merely
changing the statistics of potential future measurements, in the way that quantum mechanics
permits it, does not suffice to transmit information. The metaworld theory is not different from
ordinary quantum mechanics in this respect. If the global wavefunction is entangled, the velocity
of a given particle depends in a nonlocal way on the position of other particles, however distant
they are. Though, since the theory reproduces exactly the same statistics of measurement results
as ordinary quantum mechanics, as has been demonstrated in section 2.4, it will not permit
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faster-than-light communication. Altogether, the theory is local with respect to configuration
space (metalocality), it is nonlocal with respect to physical space (ordinary nonlocality), and it is
local with respect to signal transmission (Einstein locality).
Is it a hidden-variables theory?. In contrast to Bohmian mechanics, there is no additional variable
over and above the usual wavefunction in the objective description. The worlds corresponding
to individual particle configurations are not additional entities over and above the entity that is
described by the wavefunction, they are part of that entity. Again consider the fluid metaphor:
The fluid is the one physically existing entity, and it readily entails the physical existence of all
of its constituents, which are the infinitesimal volume elements moving with the fluid. In much
the same way, the entity described by the wavefunction, the metaworld, entails all worlds, and
they move with the metaworld because they are part of it. The configuration of a particular world
comes into play only when switching to the subjective description that refers to that world. Hence,
the metaworld theory is objectively a wavefunction-only theory, but subjectively it is a hidden-
variables-theory, where the term “hidden” gains an even stronger meaning, as the configuration of
a particular world actual to some observer, which would be the additional variable here, is hidden
from the objective description.
Is it an objective theory?. The theory includes the possibility to switch to the perspective of an
arbitrary observer, similar as in, for example, the theory of relativity. The theory itself does not
depend on a given observer, hence it is not a genuinely subjective theory. But there is more to
this issue than just these simple statements. The theory actually provides an example where the
ontology of a physical theory (its “interpretation”) has a profound impact on its mathematical
structure. The velocity equation (28) and the Born rule (3) can both not be derived without
accepting that there is a continuous infinity of physically existing entities, termed “worlds”, that
correspond to individual particle configurations. Moreover, the Born rule remains a meaningless
equation and cannot be interpreted in terms of probability, without accepting that the universe
is an experienced universe, that is, it presents itself to someone who experiences it, and that the
subject of experience, termed “person”, experiences it from within exactly one world. The dualities
of wave and particle, of determinism and indeterminism, of wavefunction-only description and
hidden-variables description, all turn out to be reducible to an underlying duality of objectivity
and subjectivity, or as one may also put it, of matter and mind. These are clearly statements that
are usually not considered as belonging to the domain of physics but rather to that of philosophy,
yet more particularly, to the philosophy of mind and to metaphysics. I considered myself until
quite recently a reductive physicalist, and I would not have thought of getting convinced that
the mere assumption or denial of subjective experience would have had any substantial impact
on a physical theory. However, as matters are, I now consider it necessary to abandon the strict
paradigm of physics as a purely objective reasoning that always must be applied from the the
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third-person perspective, thus viewed “from nowhere”. It appears, it strongly appears, that there
is something fundamental lacking in the third-person description of reality as it is provided by
traditional physics: the phenomenon of experience. At the risk of sounding pathetic, I suggest
that without integrating the possibility, yet the inevitability, of a first-person perspective into the
description of nature, we may go on applying quantum mechanics very successfully, but we will
never fully understand it.
4. Appendix
4.1. Equivalence of the velocity equation (28) with Bohm’s original guiding equation
For those familar with modern formulations of Bohmian mechanics, equation (28) will be
immediately recognized as the guiding equation. For those not so familar, let me briefly show the
formal equivalence. Using (24) and (26), equation (28) can be rewritten as
q˙t =
jt
ρt
=
~
2mi
Ψ∗t∇Ψt −Ψt∇Ψ∗t
|Ψt|2 (53)
=
~
m
Im
{∇Ψt
Ψt
}
(54)
Bohm’s original formulation involves the modulus Rt and the phase St of the wavefunction, which
are related by Ψt = Rte
i
~St . Inserting this into the above equation, we arrive at
q˙t =
~
m
Im
{∇Rt
Rt
+
i
~
∇St
}
=
1
m
∇St, (55)
and with pt = mq˙t, we finally obtain
pt = ∇St, (56)
which is the equation postulated by Bohm in his Postulate 2, also known as the “guiding equation”
(Bohm, 1952a, page 172).
4.2. Spin measurement
Let us briefly exemplify how spin would be included in the theory, to the extent that measure-
ment is concerned. The wavefunction of a single spin-1/2 particle involves one additional degree
of freedom as compared to a spin-0 particle, and it can be represented as
ψ(q) =
(
ψ↑(q)
ψ↓(q)
)
, (57)
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where ψ↑ and ψ↓ are the up and down spin components of the wavefunction with respect to the
z-direction, associated with the observable
σˆz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (58)
If the particle was alone in the universe, it could not be measured, since a measurement involves at
least two systems, one to be measured, the observed system, and one to represent the measurement
device, the observer system. Let us now consider such a universe, and let the total system be
initially in a state where the observed particle is disentangled from the observer system, so the
pre-measurement state reads
Ψ(x, y) =
(
ψ↑(x)
ψ↓(x)
)
⊗ φ0(y), (59)
where x = q1 and y = (q2, . . . , qN) are the configurations of the observed particle and the
observer system, respectively. The measurement process has to generate entanglement between the
particle’s spin degree of freedom and the observer system, otherwise there would be no information
about the spin of the particle transferred to the observer system. Thus the post-measurement state
of the total system obtains the form
Ψ′(x, y) =
(
ψ↑(x)⊗ φ↑(y)
ψ↓(x)⊗ φ↓(y)
)
, (60)
where φ↑(y) and φ↓(y) correspond to the states of the observer system that represent the measure-
ment results “spin up” and “spin down”, respectively. Since the transition must be unitary, we have
‖φ↑‖ = ‖φ↓‖ = ‖φ0‖. The states φ↑ and φ↓ describe distinct configurations if and only if they have
non-overlapping support in their configuration space Y , thus consider the two disjoint sets Y↑ and
Y↓, so that suppφ↑ = Y↑ and suppφ↓ = Y↓. A suitable and well-known device that fulfills these
requirements for the case of spin-1/2 is a Stern-Gerlach device: The incident electron beam is split
into two spatially separated subbeams, each one corresponding to electrons with either spin up or
spin down, so the electron beam is itself part of the pointer, which means that even the electron
wavefunctions ψ↑(x) and ψ↓(x) have non-overlapping support after the measurement, that is, each
of them becomes entangled with respect to spin and position. In any case, the electrons are made
visible by a detection screen or they are registered by an electron detector, and this device can be
taken as the observer system.
The measurement results reads “up” in a particular world if and only if its configuration
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q = (x, y) is contained in the set Q↑ := X × Y↑. According to (16), this happens with probability
P (Q↑) =
µ(Q↑)
µ(Q) =
∫
Q↑
dqΨ′†(q)Ψ′(q)∫
dqΨ′†(q)Ψ′(q)
(61)
=
∫
X
dx
∫
Y↑
dy |ψ↑(x)⊗ φ↑(y)|2∫
dqΨ′†(q)Ψ′(q)
(62)
=
‖ψ↑‖2‖φ↑‖2
‖ψ↑‖2‖φ↑‖2 + ‖ψ↑‖2‖φ↓‖2 (63)
=
‖ψ↑‖2
‖ψ↑‖2 + ‖ψ↓‖2 . (64)
Analogously, we obtain
P (Q↓) =
‖ψ↓‖2
‖ψ↑‖2 + ‖ψ↓‖2 (65)
for Q↓ = X × Y↓. Thus we obtain the same probabilities as in standard quantum mechanics. If
the pre-measurement state of the observed system is itself disentangled with respect to spin and
position, then it can be written as
ψ(x) =
(
α
β
)
χ(x), (66)
where χ is a scalar wavefunction, and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. The resulting probabilities then take the
more familiar form
P (Q↑) = |α|2 (67)
P (Q↓) = |β|2. (68)
An analog procedure carried out with two spin-entangled electrons measured along arbitrary axes
would lead to the well-known expression of Bell-type experiments, thereby showing quantum
nonlocality.
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